CROATIAN PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS (1)

ZAGREB, Jan 22 (Hina) - Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Wednesday delivered a state of the nation address at a joint session of both houses of the Croatian Parliament. The following is the full text of the first part of the address: Mr. Speaker of the Chamber of Representatives and of the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia, Madam Speaker of the Chamber of Counties, Distinguished members of both Chambers of the Croatian Parliament, Distinguished members of the Croatian Government, and all representatives of executive and judiciary authorities, Distinguished guests of church and public communities, members of the diplomatic corps, and all present, Ladies and gentlemen, I. SALIENT FEATURES OF 1996 The largest part of Croatia's occupied area was liberated in 1995. This secured the existence of the Croatian State and protected its long-term strategic interests. With the achievement of this, the fundamental goal of overall national and State policy, the preconditions were established for 1996 to become the first truly peace-time year. The basic goals of Croatian State policy in 1996 were the following: ensuring the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian Region; the strengthening of the foreign policy position of sovereign and independent Croatia as a Central European State; continuous building and strengthening of the democratic system based on the rule of law and social justice; and continuous reorganization of the economy which would guarantee and promote development, employment and gradual improvement of the standard of living of employed persons, retired people and the sufferers of the Homeland War alike. I believe that I can claim with all reason, in the introduction to this report, that we have been successful in achieving these fundamental goals of State policy to the greatest possible extent. If we assessed 1995, with good reason, as a year of"...tumultuous development and important events of the highest historical significance since the establishment of the independent and democratic Croatian State...," then the past year, 1996, can also be assessed as having been very successful. The results achieved in the latter year, and throughout the period since the establishment of sovereign Croatia, can be denied only out of ignorance and malevolence or petty demagogic politics. Over the past year the leadership of the State, the Croatian people and all Croatian citizens faced, however, rather different, and even new challenges and tasks. This occurred in changed, peace-time conditions, but they nevertheless were and remain to be affected by the heavy legacy of war, and very complex international circumstances. Among them particular mention should be made of the repeated attempts of external interference in the internal democratic development of sovereign Croatia, as well as of the plans of international circles concerning the regional integration of Croatia within a Balkan or Southeast- European framework, which are totally unacceptable to the Croatian people. II. RESTORATION OF THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND JURIDICAL ORDER IN THE CROATIAN DANUBIAN AREA Having changed the overall relations with our military victories, the liberation of the central occupied parts of the Croatian State and the shift of the strategic balance of forces in the region, we were given firm guarantees of the international community concerning the peaceful reintegration of the remaining occupied area, i.e., Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmium. Thus, early 1996 saw the start of implementation of the Zagreb-Erdut Agreement on the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian Region, under the Transitional UNTAES Administration headed by General J. Klein, into the constitutional and juridical system of the Croatian State. Although the beginning of reintegration was delayed several months, the demilitarization of the Danubian Region was completed successfully on June 21, 1996. In the process 16,000 members of Serbian paramilitary units were demilitarized without any incident, with the concurrent withdrawal of all heavy weapons. At the same time, the purchase of light and personal weapons left with the civil population of the region was started in cooperation by UNTAES and the Ministry of the Interior. As the demilitarization of the Croatian Danubian Region was completed, the Transitional Police assumed its duties; at present it also includes more than 300 Croatian policemen, and there is a tendency to have this number increased. During 1996 the first results in the implementation of peaceful reintegration - after the disarmament of the Serbian paramilitary units - involved the opening of the most important communications - road and railway traffic, and the waterways - and the return of the Djeletovci oil field. Following the normalization of Croato-Serbian relations, a regular international border crossing between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established at Bajakovo (near Lipovac). The other border crossings to FR Yugoslavia are controlled by transitional customs authorities which include Croatian customs officers, and the border regime is enforced pursuant to Croatian law. Similarly, a regular border crossing was also opened between Croatia and Hungary (at Knezevo), resulting very soon in lively traffic between Osijek and Hungary. As early as during 1996 UNTAES restored part of the Croatian Danubian Region - several places in the so-called Sirmium triangle - to full Croatian sovereignty. The return of Croatian displaced persons to their homes was also started successfully in the area, and this was made possible by the exemplary organization of reconstruction financed by the Croatian State. The activities of all public services of importance for the normal life of the population were also established immediately. This finally marked the beginning of the return of Croatian displaced persons after no less than five years of uncertainty. Return along the same model will also start soon to the villages of Antunovac, Ernestinovo and Bilje, as well as to the area of the so-called Baranja triangle. Peaceful reintegration will be completed fully by mid-1997, and it may realistically be assumed that the return of displaced persons will be completed by no later than the end of the year. The implementation of peaceful reintegration was also possible because part of the Serbian population does not oppose reintegration, especially after the normalization of relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia (Serbia). However, in spite of the initial success of reintegration, it should be noted that there is still tough opposition by groups of Serbian extremists who do not want to resign themselves to the inevitable return of the Danubian Region to the constitutional, juridical and economic system of Croatia. Some representatives of the local Serbs have also raised requests - which are unrealistic and totally unacceptable for the Croatian public - for political autonomy of the region and its special status, in the attempt to continue delaying the implementation of the peaceful settlement. As opposed to that, Croatia has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness for a peaceful resolution by guaranteeing all civil and ethnic (minority) rights to the Serbian population. On this occasion, too, I call on all Serbs, Croatian citizens from these areas, to take part in the elections for the bodies of local and county self-government, and for the Chamber of Counties of the Croatian Parliament. My recent stay in Vukovar and on the Danubian border marked more than symbolically the near and final return of the Croatian State to the Croatian Danubian Region. Let me take this opportunity to pay, before this august House, due credit to the Croatian displaced persons for their proud, patient and dignified attitude, and for their trust in the activities of all the components of Croatian State authorities. We should also give due credit to the Transitional Administrator General Klein for his persistent and reasonable endeavours to bring peaceful reintegration to a successful completion in spite of all difficulties. This will also imply the successful completion of the UNTAES mandate as a rare example of peace-keeping force efficiency. There can no longer be any doubt that in 1997 Croatia will return without new casualties and destruction - with its victorious banners - to Vukovar, this symbol of Croatia's struggle for her freedom and State, and restore Baranja, Eastern Slavonia and Western Sirmium to the fold of the Homeland. III. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF CROATIA 1. The Guidelines of Croatian Foreign Policy In my last year's Address to the Croatian Parliament I outlined the fundamental guidelines of Croatian foreign policy in greater detail. They are as follows: the achievement of sovereign Croatian authority throughout the territory of the State; the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the consistent implementation of the Washington and Dayton agreements; the promotion and development of political, economic and every other form of cooperation with all countries, neighbouring countries in particular, while firmly and consistently upholding our national and State interests. We also attach particular importance to Croatia's orientation to European, particularly Central European economic integrations, and to the Euro-Atlantic security integration. Over the past year we have also paid particular attention to intensifying our friendly and partnership relations with the leading global superpower, the United States of America, also in the political and defence fields. We have also promoted good and friendly relations with all the countries of the European Union, with the Holy See as the principal global moral authority, with the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China and other Asian countries, with the States of the Conference of Islamic Countries and with the countries of the non-aligned movement. Today Croatia has diplomatic relations with 120 States, and the process of establishment of diplomatic relations is under way with an additional 7 States. We have always been interested in developing the best possible relations with all countries with large communities of Croatian expatriates. 2. Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina After the Dayton Agreement The change of the strategic situation which ensued after the Croatian military successes created the preconditions for the peaceful initiative of the Contact Group countries led by the USA, and resulted in the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. At the Dayton Conference Croatia was one of the most appreciated constructive factors, and it provided a major contribution to the successful completion of the Conference, to the termination of war, and to the new constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Agreement secured Croatian strategic interests. It guaranteed the existence and equality of the Croatian people as a constituent people throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly in the Croato-Bosniac Federation, pursuant to the Washington Agreement on the implementation of the Federation and on its close link with Croatia. The Agreement (also signed in Paris on December 14, 1995) on the Establishment of the Joint Council for Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also signed for the same purpose. However, in this connection there have appeared certain open questions, about which we have already initiated talks with the representatives of the Croatian and Bosniac peoples, based on the agreement in principle on the connection of Croatia and the Federation. In terms of the Dayton Agreement as a whole, its military part has been fully implemented, whereas the political part is affected by many difficulties and different intentions. In this regard the position of Croatia is clear and consistent. We believe that one should implement both the letter and the spirit of the Dayton Agreement, but also of the Washington Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only this can guarantee peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and create the prerequisites for the establishment of a new international order in the region. Because of its geopolitical connection Croatia cannot be disinterested in the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or in the destiny of part of the Croatian people which can ensure its existence only as a constituent and equal people most closely linked with the sovereign Croatian State. This is not only a matter of strategic national and State interest, but also the constitutional commitment of the Croatian State and the moral commitment of the entire Croatian people. 3. Croatia's Relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) The gradual normalization of relations between Croatia and the FR of Yugoslavia started after the agreement, achieved at the Dayton Peace Conference, on the peaceful return of the still occupied parts of the Croatian Danubian Region to the constitutional and juridical order of Croatia. Throughout the period since the severance of constitutional links with the former Yugoslavia, Croatian State policy has taken due account of the need to normalize Croato-Serbian relations on the basis of mutual recognition and respect of territorial integrity. The peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian Region, the stability of peace and progress in the region would not be possible without the normalization of these relations. This is why Croatian foreign policy has attached importance to the normalization of relations with Serbia in spite of some fairly loud voices that one should not renew and normalize relations with those who are guilty of the war of conquest and of all the evil caused. Whoever has any knowledge of history and international relations in the modern world will find such views obviously untenable. Not only because of the world but also in its own interest Croatia must aim at normal neighbourly relations with Serbia, although it no longer wants to have any common State or special integrative links with it. However, the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, and of traffic and economic links, was inevitable, and it has benefited both states and the international community, as a precondition for the stability of the new international order. After the Dayton Conference the normalization of relations was somewhat delayed, mainly because of the resistance and speculations related to the Croatian Danubian Region and Prevlaka. A new momentum ensued after my meeting with Slobodan Milosevic (at the invitation of the Greek Prime Minister Simitis) in Athens on August 6, 1996. A short time thereafter, on August 23, 1996, the Agreement on Normalization of Relations was signed in Belgrade, and full diplomatic relations were established, through the exchange of diplomatic notes, on September 9, 1996. The existing missions were elevated to embassy status. With the Agreement on Normalization the FR of Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia, definitively recognized the territorial integrity of Croatia, and made it clearly known, not only to its extremists but also to the entire Serbian population in Croatia, that they could no longer count on armed help but, rather, that they had to accept the Croatian State. Although there are still a number of unresolved issues between Croatia and the FR of Yugoslavia, one should hope that the process of normalization will continue. In this connection, several bilateral agreements are being prepared (on air, road and rail traffic; on international traffic; on double taxation avoidance; on water resource protection; on social insurance). The Agreement on Normalization has met with great approval of all international factors as evidence of the cessation of the "state of war" and of the establishment of peace in this region. 4. Croatia and European Integrations In my last year's Address to the Parliament, as I have already noted, I also indicated the return of Croatia to the Central European civilizational and economic circle, with a clear commitment to Euro-Atlantic integrations, as one of the most important tasks of Croatian foreign policy. In this direction Croatia has consistently developed its democratic order in spite of all the hardships of war. However, the first formal step was made only with the admission of Croatia to the Council of Europe on November 6, 1996. This step was delayed for a long time and without justification because of the disinclination of those political circles in Europe which thought, and still think, that Yugoslavia had to be preserved whatever the cost as a successful model of a multinational and multiconfessional state community. Yugoslavia was to them the mainstay of the Versailles order in Southeastern Europe, but also an example to other peoples in multinational European States demonstrating that one could and should remain in such multinational communities. The preservation of the former Yugoslavia through the reform communists was persistently supported by many international factors from London, Paris, Rome and Bonn to Moscow and Washington. This was manifest particularly in the crucial days of 1989 and 1990, when Ante Markovic was promised substantial financial assistance from the West if he succeeded, with his Alliance of Reform Forces, in sustaining Yugoslavia as a democratic free market country. At the time, former President Mitterrand also promised to Borislav Jovic French support for integration in the European Community, as well as bilateral cooperation in the development of Yugoslavia. Quite obviously, Gorbachev also supported Yugoslavia and insisted with Yeltsin to take a clear-cut stand, fearing that the example of Yugoslavia would have a negative influence on the readiness of the peoples of the Soviet Union, primarily the Baltic peoples, to remain in the Soviet community. Similar views were also advocated by official representatives of other European Community countries. When all the effort to preserve Yugoslavia proved futile, and when it disintegrated in spite of the expectations of international circles that the strong Yugocommunist army would prevent Croatia from achieving independence, different attempts have been made to revive the Yugoslav community. Since the state-political idea was discredited, the various attempts proceeded, and still do, from the purposefulness of economic links, in the hope that this will also in time allow for the establishment of new constitutional links. At first this assignment was entrusted to "nongovernmental organizations," "renowned intellectuals" and "pragmatic businessmen," and today one has reached the point of official regional integration drafts proposed by authoritative international factors. As early as September, 1992 a meeting was held in Belgrade on a new community of the former Yugoslav republics. The promoter and the main organizer, Boris Vukobrat, established - with obvious external political and monetary support - a "Foundation for Peace and Crisis Settlement" based on the need to create a new community. "Scientific meetings" followed one another. One was held at the influential Harvard University on the proposal of Professor Roger Fischer concerning the overall solution for the former Yugoslavia in terms of a new "Yugoslav" or "Balkan Union." Subsequently the Council of Europe and local Istrian authorities organized in Brtonigla, on Croatian territory, a meeting on "Regional Self-Government and Cooperation Across Borders." Later still, in the autumn of 1996, in Australia there appeared a brochure entitled "Istria - Europe's Experiment." The masked subtitle, "A Cultural Project," actually concealed an aspiration to single Istria out of Croatia (along with parts in Slovenia and Italy) into a "Region Within Europe." A "Fund for Istrianhood" was also set up in order to support such a transformation of Istria into an "international European culture park," and outstanding members of the IDS (Istrian Democratic Diet) are also being mentioned among the initiators of the project. Paris was the venue of the Conference on the Economic Development of the Balkans and Southeastern Europe, organized by Vukobrat's Foundation and the International "Europe and the Balkans" Network of the University in Bologna. A more attractive name, "Euroslavia," also came from Italy. The scientific director of the Conference was Prof. Branko Horvat of Zagreb, and the Conference was financially supported by the Commission of the European Union! The public has somewhat better, but still inadequate, knowledge of the activity of Soros's Open Society Foundation. This widespread network enjoys great foreign support as a successful example of activity focused on the revival of "democratic space" in the area of the former Yugoslavia, even if Soros's activity has been criminally investigated in some countries (such as, among others, the United States and Italy). Among similar so-called scientific meetings dealing predominantly with human rights in the region as a precondition for their linkage, one should also mention the conference of the Ditchley Foundation, held in England on the future of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. There is also the attempt of the group led by Dr. Paul Werner of Germany to achieve, under the "high- sounding" name of DEHOS (General Democratic Croatian Diet), a coalition of left and liberal Croatian parties assumed to be in favour, in terms of their programmes, of re-integration. There have also been attempts to promote regional ideas at the official level. An initiative for the conclusion of a regional security pact, known as the Royaumont Declaration, was launched in France already during Balladur's former government. The so-called Bulgarian Initiative was also renewed, relying on the meetings of foreign ministers of Balkan countries in Belgrade in 1988 and in Tirana in 1990, involving the idea of cooperation among countries in the region in providing for stability and uniform standards so as to facilitate the integration of the entire region into Europe. The so-called Balkan Economic Council initiated by Greece had a similar purpose. As contrasted to the regional Balkan initiative of the European Union, the American initiative on cooperation in Southeastern Europe (SECI) has had identical, but also particular and deeper motives. Already in my last year's Address to the Parliament I mentioned the appearance of ideas on the need for regional Balkan or Southeast-European integration, and in May 1996 I also convened the Presidential Council, drawing attention to the fact that such views could influence the conclusion of Croatia's future agreement with the European Union. As of mid-1996 the European Union also began to publish officially its "regional approach" in the realization of cooperation with countries which achieved independence through the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and with Albania. The view culminated in late 1996 with the document of the EU Ministerial Council entitled "Common Principles for Future Contractual Relations with Certain Countries in Southeastern Europe." The document placed Croatia in the same "basket" with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. In diplomatic circles the draft is known as "5+1-1": countries of the former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania. According to the basic thesis of this approach to the countries "south of Slovenia and north of Greece" - as the EU representative Carl Bildt has called them - the European Union will request from these countries to establish cooperation and connection, similar to those existing in the Union, as a precondition for the Union's cooperation with each of them. Moreover, the development of open and cooperative relations is made conditional not only upon mutual cooperation in all possible fields, but also upon the creation of integral systems in the fields of energy, telecommunications, information, all types of transportation, agriculture, protection of the environment, free traffic of people and goods. In a nutshell, these are stronger links than achieved anywhere so far. According to the American initiative on the regional integration of countries in the Union of Southeastern Europe (SECI), Croatia would find itself even more deeply within a total Balkan framework. Along with the countries envisioned by the regional plan of the European Union - that is, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania - the Southeast European Union would also comprise Bulgaria, Romania and Moldavia, and even Greece and Turkey, with the addition of Hungary and Slovenia. The prerequisites in terms of the tenor, that is, cooperation and linking of these countries, of this more broadly conceived regional integration are identical to the plan for the integration of the Yugo-Balkan region according to the EU proposal. Regardless of substantial similarities, there are obvious differences between the two ideas (the more limited and the broader one) of regional integration. The first is based on the tenaciously present Versailles views (and interests) of certain European powers, whereas the second, the US idea, is essentially more in opposition to, than in accordance with, the EU idea. At the recent meeting of the abovementioned countries convened by the United States in Geneva (December 5 and 6, 1996) the Croatian representative did not commit himself to the initial document, the Statement of Purpose, and neither did the Slovenian representative, for reasons of principle, because Slovenia had no Government. The organizers had desisted from inviting Yugoslavia, but it was mentioned that it would also, obviously, be included. Along with the United States, the representatives of the European Union - the Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands troika - as well as Russia were also present at the Geneva meeting. The implications of such an integration - whether Euroyugoslav, Balkan or Southeast-European - for Croatia can easily be grasped by any reasonable and informed citizen of our State. In terms of its geopolitical position, of its history fourteen centuries long, of its civilization and culture Croatia belongs to the Central European and Mediterranean circle within Europe. The political link with the Balkans from 1918 to 1990 was only a brief episode in Croatian history, and we are determined in never seeing it repeated again! The cooperation - actually integration - with our southern neighbours which is being proposed to us as a precondition for our relations with the European Union would lead to economic regression and, after a time, to renewed political links, and this would imply denial of everything Croatia has achieved with its arduously won independence. Therefore, Croatia cannot accept any regional integrations other than that which will eventually ensue with full membership in the European Union. While the Croatian public generally believes that these plans of regional integration are opposed to Croatian national interests, this is not the view upheld in the FR of Yugoslavia, where such plans are accepted, and some political factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina have also immediately and wholeheartedly accepted the regional approach. That sufficiently speaks for itself! All this should be considered by those individuals in Croatia who advocate the regional approach because, allegedly, by accepting it Croatia would take over the main role in the establishment of closer ties with Europe, and not Serbia/Yugoslavia! This is precisely the main enticement in the attempt to win Croatia over to such plans. However, Croatia has had sufficient experience with similar ideas from the past century to the present day. Therefore, the time of immaturity of Croatian policy, and of seeking support in political circles of other countries, is now irretrievably a matter of the past. Through the achievement of its independence and sovereignty Croatia has created the foundations for managing its foreign policy in line with Croatian national and State interests, taking due account of international relations but succumbing to no whim or interest of forces not inclined to it. While accepting no formal integration in any regional framework, Croatia is nevertheless fully committed to developing good relations with all the States in the region, particularly in projects of common interest such as traffic arteries and the power industry infrastructure. Within the scope of European integration trends Croatia participates in the Central European Initiative, the Alps-Adriatic Working Community, and its interest is particularly focused on establishing the best and closest economic cooperation with the countries of the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). The conclusion of economic agreements with the countries of the Association, and membership in it, must be an immediate objective of Croatian foreign policy because this will allow Croatia to return more rapidly and appropriately to the natural, geopolitical and cultural-civilizational framework to which it belongs and from which it was wrested away, albeit through no fault of its own. With respect to Croatia's cooperation with European States in promoting the idea of European security and stability, it should be noted that Croatia has supported the principles of the former Conference and present Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe since its admission to the Organization. It has similarly endorsed the effective implementation of these principles not only within the Croatian State but also in the broader environment which is still threatened by the danger of armed conflict and instability. This is particularly manifest in Croatia's acceptance to the establishment of monitoring missions responsible for observing the condition of human and minority rights, and the development of democratic institutions. The same applies to Croatia's participation in the subregional agreement on weapons limitation, which ought to prevent any of the neighbouring countries to strengthen its national security assets to the detriment of others. Within the scope of overall Euro-Atlantic cooperation focused on ensuring peace and security Croatia wants to join the Partnership for Peace and become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because it believes that this Organization provides the best guarantee for the security of each of its members and for the stability of the overall international order. 5. Croatia and the United Nations In the vast majority of cases cooperation with the UN, as well as with the permanent missions of individual member States, has been very good. The same applies to specialized UN organizations and agencies. However, due mention ought to be made of one field of United Nations activity which reflects certain peculiar relations of insufficient impartiality, or even disinclination with respect to Croatia. How can one explain, and on what grounds, the fact that the UN Secretariat has been submitting to the Security Council unfavourable reports on the state of compliance with human rights in Croatia, especially after the liberation of occupied areas by operations Flash and Storm? Are these not, just as past fault- finding concerning admission to the Council of Europe, singular pressures brought to bear on Croatia? The logical follow-up question would be: why? Croatia certainly does not and cannot oppose in any respect the international monitoring and evaluation of compliance with human rights in its territory. However, what is surprising is the fact that compliance with human rights is continuously being raised only in the case of Croatia, whereas it is not the object of attention of the Security Council in those other countries in the world in which the reasons for such concerns are unequivocally far more substantial. Why has the Security Council never discussed, as a major and separate item, the violations of human rights committed over a number of years to the detriment of the Croatian people in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina? One cannot help feeling that such actions are focused on making the human rights issue an efficient means of political pressure on the Republic of Croatia for the sake of entirely different goals! Quite certainly, we must spare no effort ourselves in order to avoid any violation of human rights in Croatia or to reduce it as much as possible. After the terrible events during the war brought about by Yugocommunist and Great-Serbian aggression, the political and psychological climate is still such as to occasion sporadic incidents by individuals. But these do not in any way reflect the State policy of the Republic of Croatia. Croatia is doing everything, through its bodies of government, in order to prevent incidents caused by personal traumas and frustrations of individuals. 6. Other Foreign Policy Activities Over the past period the main lines of activity of Croatian foreign policy were focused on the promotion of Croatian interests with the most important international factors - the United Nations, the USA, the Contact Group countries, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and others. We can claim with satisfaction that these efforts have served their purpose, and that they have contributed to strengthening the international position and reputation of the Republic of Croatia. With its policy, with the strength of its democratic order and consistency in the promotion of security and stability in the international order, Croatia has become a compelling constructive factor in this part of Europe. The development of comprehensively good relations with the United States has been reflected particularly in the friendly visit of President Clinton to Zagreb, as well as in my meeting with the President and Vice-President Gore in Washington last August, and my other meetings with high- ranking American officials. To this should be added the many meetings of ministers Granic and Susak, and other Croatian civil and military officials, with their high-ranking American counterparts. In this way Croatia is coming closer to meeting the conditions for joining the Partnership for Peace Programme and for integration into the North Atlantic security system. Croatia continues to develop good relations with all members of the European Union, particularly with Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Austria, with which it has good or very good economic, cultural and other ties. Relations with neighbouring countries are good, and Croatia has no major outstanding issues with them. Certain problems do not affect the generally good relations with Slovenia. The relations between Croatia and Hungary are particularly good, and so are the relations with other countries of the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). Over the past period good relations have also been sustained and developed with many Asian countries. In addition to the very good and friendly relations with the People's Republic of China, relations have also progressed with other Asian countries, e.g., with Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, (South) Korea, India and other countries of the largest continent. Friendly relations with Argentina, Chile, Brazil and other Latin American countries, and with the member States of the Conference of Islamic Countries and many African countries, are also developing equally well. In addition to my numerous meetings, the many meetings of the members of the Croatian Government with foreign high-ranking government officials (heads of state, prime ministers and ministers) bear witness to the international renown of Croatia and the ever more comprehensive development of friendly relations. This year eight foreign heads of state and prime ministers are expected to visit Croatia, and I have received seven invitations to visit other countries. It should be emphasized that Croatia concluded, in 1996, 97 bilateral and 10 multilateral treaties regulating inter-State relations in a variety of fields - from economic, scientific and cultural cooperation to the abolition of visas. Finally, it should be noted that Croatia will sustain, in the time to come, the consistent implementation of its foreign policy in the interest of peace and stability in Europe and worldwide, and of good and fruitful cooperation with all the countries of the world. (To Be Continued) (hina) mm vm 221216 MET jan 97